Private record linkage is the problem of identifying pairs of records that are similar as per an input matching rule from databases that are held by two parties that do not trust one another. We identify three key desiderata that a PRL solution must ensure: a proof of end-to-end privacy, communication and computational costs that scale subquadratically in the number of input records, perfect precision and high recall of matching pairs. We show that all of the existing solutions for PRL-including secure 2-party computation (S2PC), and their variants that use non-private or differentially private (DP) blocking -violate at least one of the three desiderata. In particular, S2PC techniques guarantee end-to-end privacy but have either low recall or high cost. We show that DP blocking based techniques do not provide an end-to-end privacy guarantee as DP does not permit the release of any exact answers (including matching records in PRL).
INTRODUCTION
Organizations are increasingly collecting vast amounts of data from individuals to advance science, public health, re- source management and governance, and business intelligence. In a number of scenarios, different organizations would like to collaboratively analyze their data in order to mine patterns that they cannot learn from their individual datasets. For instance, hospitals or health workers in neighboring cities might want to identify HIV positive patients who have sought care in multiple cities to quantify the mobility patterns of patients, and hence the spread of the virus. This requires finding patients who occur in multiple databases even though the patient records might not have the same primary key across databases. This problem is called record linkage, and has been well studied for the last several decades [7, 10, 13] . Record linkage between databases DA and DB in the absence of reliable keys is often formulated as identifying pairs of "matching" records a ∈ DA and b ∈ DB such that a and b satisfy a matching rule m : ΣA × ΣB → {0, 1}. A matching rule can be distance-metric based or be conjunctions of predicates over different types of attributes. For arbitrary matching rules, finding all matches between DA and DB requires comparing all pairs of records.
In a collaborative analysis across organizations, privacy is always a concern. In particular, one of the collaborating parties, say Hospital A, should not be able to tell whether or not a record is in the database of the other party, say Hospital B, if that record does not appear in the match output. Privacy constraints arise due to concerns from individuals who provide their data, such as hospital patients, or due to contractual or legal obligations that organizations have to the individuals in their data. This has led to a field of research called private record linkage (PRL).
Traditional PRL techniques aim to solve the linkage problem with a strong privacy goal -no information should be leaked beyond (a) the sizes of the datasets, and (b) the set of matching records. However, this strong privacy goal (which we call S2PC) [15] comes with a cost. Existing techniques that achieve this goal either require cryptographically secure comparisons of all pairs of records (and hence are inefficient), or are restricted to equi-joins (and thus have very poor recall). Hence, we formalize our problem as follows: given private databases DA and DB held by two semi-honest parties, and a matching rule m, we would like to design a protocol Π that outputs pairs of matching records to both parties which satisfies three desiderata: (1) correctness in terms of high recall of matches, (2) provable end-to-end privacy guarantee, and (3) efficiency in terms of sub-quadratic communication and computational cost in n, where n = max(|DA|, |DB|).
Techniques that securely compare all pairs of records (APC) have a quadratic cost and hence fail to meet the efficiency requirement of our problem. Techniques for efficient private set intersection (PSI) [12] satisfy all three desiderata, but only for a limited set of equlity-like matching rules. For general fuzzy matching rules, however, PSI results in poor recall. When records in DA and DB come from the same discrete domain, one could expand DA by adding all records that could potentially match with a record in DA, and then find matches by running PSI on the expanded DA and DB. This technique, which we call PSI+X, can be very inefficient.
A long line of work [27, 20, 17, 18, 22, 6] has considered scaling APC by using blocking, a standard technique for scaling non-private record linkage with a small loss in recall of matching pairs. However, blocking can reveal sensitive properties of input records. We show that such hybrid protocols do not ensure an end-to-end privacy guarantee even in solutions where the blocking step satisfies a strong privacy notion, called differential privacy [11] . This is because neither blocking nor differentially private blocking naturally compose with the strong privacy guarantees of S2PC.
To our knowledge, this work presents the first solution of solving the above open problem, and makes the following contributions:
• We propose and formalize three desiderata for the PRL problem: (a) correctness, or high recall of matches, (b) end-to-end privacy, or insensitivity to the presence or absence of an individual record that is not a matching record, and (c) efficiency, or communication and computational costs that scale subquadratically in the input size. We show that all of the existing solutions for PRL violate at least one of the three desiderata. ( § 2)
• This motivates us to develop a novel privacy definition, which we call Output Constrained DP. Protocols satisfying this notion are allowed to truthfully return the output of a specific function, but must be insensitive to the presence or absence of individual records whose presence do not affect the function output. ( § 3.1)
• We adapt the notion of Output Constrained DP to the context of PRL. Under this privacy notion, computationally bounded adversaries can not distinguish two different protocol executions when a single non-matching record is replaced by another non-matching record in one of the databases. This privacy notion allows protocols to truthfully release the true set of matching records. ( § 3.2) • We develop novel protocols for private record linkage that leverage non-private blocking strategies. Our protocols ensure end-to-end privacy (Theorems 4.2 and 4.6), provide at least as much recall as the non-private blocking strategy (Theorems 4.1 and 4.7), and achieve subquadratic scaling (Theorems 4.4 and 4.7). We also show that prior attempts [18, 22, 6 ] to scale PRL using blocking do not satisfy our privacy definition (Theorem 4.3).
( § 4)
• Using experiments on real and synthetic data, we investigate the 3-way trade-off between recall, privacy, and efficiency. Our key findings are: our protocols (1) are at least 2 orders of magnitude more efficient than S2PC baselines, (2) achieve a high recall and end-to-end privacy, and (3) achieve near linear scaling in the size of the input databases and the output set of matching pairs on real and synthetic datasets. ( § 5)
PROBLEM SETTING & STATEMENT
In this section, we formulate our problem: finding pairs of records that are similar as per an input matching rule while ensuring three desiderata: correctness, privacy, and efficiency. We then discuss prior attempts to solve this problem and how they do not satisfy one or more of the three aforementioned desiderata, thus motivating the need for a novel solution.
The Private Record Linkage Problem
Consider two parties Alice and Bob who have databases DA and DB. Let records in DA come from some domain ΣA and let the records in DB come from domain ΣB. Let m : ΣA × ΣB → {0, 1} denote a matching rule, and let DA 1m DB denote the set of matching pairs {(a, b)|a ∈ DA, b ∈ D b , m(a, b) = 1}. A matching rule can be distancemetric based: two records match if their distance is less than a threshold. For example, Euclidean distance is typically used for numeric attributes, whereas for string attributes, the distance metric is typically based on q-grams [8, 9, 28] , phonetic encoding [19] , or edit distance over strings [5, 26, 25] . A matching rule can also be conjunctions of predicates over different types of attributes. For instance, two records match if their names differ by at most 2 characters and their phone numbers differ by at most 1 digit. Alice and Bob would like to jointly compute DA 1m DB.
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Our goal is to design a protocol Π that Alice and Bob can follow to compute DA 1m DB, while satisfying the following three desiderata -correctness, privacy and efficiency.
• Correctness: Let OΠ ⊆ DA × DB denote the set of pairs output by the protocol Π as the set of matching pairs. The protocol is correct if (a) the protocol returns to both Alice and Bob the same output OΠ, and (b) OΠ = DA 1m DB, and incorrect otherwise. Note that if Alice and Bob indeed receive the same output, OΠ can only be incorrect in one way -some matching pairs (a, b) ∈ DA 1m DB are not present in OΠ. Note that Alice and Bob can filter out non-matching pairs from output OΠ by checking whether all the pairs in OΠ satisfy the matching rule. Hence, we quantify the correctness of a protocol Π using a measure called recall, which is computed as:
We require Π to have a high recall (close to 1). This precludes trivial protocols that output an empty set.
• Privacy: We assume that the data in DA and DB are sensitive. As part of the protocol Π, Alice would like no one else (including Bob) to learn whether a specific nonmatching record a is in or out of DA; and analogously for Bob. This precludes the trivial solution wherein Bob sends DB to DA in the clear so that Alice can compute DA 1m DB using standard techniques in the record linkage literature [7] . It also precludes the trivial solution wherein Alice and Bob send their records to 1 The standard record linkage problem involves learning a matching function in addition to computing the matches. Although the problem considered in this paper and in the private record linkage literature ignores this crucial aspect of record linkage, we have chosen to also use this term for continuity with existing literature on the topic.
Methods
Correctness Privacy Efficiency APC PSI PSI+X PRL+B PRL+BDP Table 1 : Summary of Prior Work a trusted third party in the clear who can then compute DA 1m DB. Formally stating a privacy definition is challenging (as we will see later in the paper) and is the key contribution of this paper. We will assume throughout the paper that Alice and Bob are semihonest, i.e., they follow the protocol honestly, but are curious about each others' databases, and are computationally bounded, i.e., they are probabilistic polynomially bounded turing machines.
• Efficiency: Jointly computing matching records would involve communication and computational cost. We assume that each record in the database has O(1) length; i.e., it does not grow with n = max(|DA|, |DB|). The communication and computational costs are bounded below by the output size, i.e. Ω(M ), where M = |DA 1m DA|. If M is quadratic in n, then the costs have to be quadratic in n to ensure high recall. Hence, we consider problems with sub-quadratic output size, and we say that the protocol is efficient if both the communication and computational costs are sub-quadratic in n, i.e., o(n 2 ).
We formalize our problem statement as follows.
Problem 1 (PRL).
Let DA and DB be private databases held by two semi-honest parties, and let m be a matching rule. Design a protocol Π that outputs pairs of matching records to both parties such that (a) Π ensures high recall close to 1, (b) Π provably guarantees privacy, and (c) Π has sub-quadratic communication and computational cost.
Prior Work
Before describing our solution, we next outline five approaches for the PRL problem from prior work -APC, PSI, PSI+X, PRL+B and PRL+BDP . Table 1 summarizes their (in)ability to satisfy our three desiderata.
All-Pairwise Comparisons (APC).
One approach to solve the PRL problem, which we call APC, works as follows: (a) design a secure 2-party algorithm that takes as input a record a ∈ DA and a record b ∈ DB and outputs to both parties the pair (a, b) if the value of m(a, b) = 1 without leaking any additional information, and (b) run the secure comparison algorithm for every pair of records in DA × DB. The secure comparison primitive can be implemented either using garbled circuits [29] or (partially) homomorphic encryption [24] , depending on the matching rule. APC achieves a recall of 1, but required a quadratic number communication and computational cost since it performs |DA| × |DB| secure pairwise comparisons.
APC provides a strong end-to-end privacy guarantee -it leaks no information other than the sizes of the databases and the set of matching records. This guarantee is formalized as follows.
Definition 1 (IND-S2PC [15] ). A2-party protocol Π that computes function f satisfies IND-S2PC if for any DA, and for every pair of DB and D B where f (DA, DB) = f (DA, D B ), the view of Alice during the execution of Π over (DA, DB) is computationally indistinguishable from the view over (DA, D B ), i.e. for any probabilistic polynomial adversary T ,
and the same holds for the view of Bob over (DA, DB) and (D A , DB) for f (DA, DB) = f (D A , DB). negl(κ) refers to any function that is o(κ −c ), for all constants c, and VIEW Π A (DA, ·) (VIEW Π B (·, DB) resp.) denotes the view of Alice (Bob resp.) during an execution of Π.
The IND-S2PC definition uses κ as a "security" parameter to control various quantities. The size of the adversary is polynomial in κ, and the output of the protocol is at most polynomial in κ. The views of the protocol execution are also parameterized by κ.
In PRL, let f1 m be the function that takes as inputs DA and DB, and outputs a triple (|DA|, |DB|, DA 1m DB). The view of Alice, VIEW To summarize, APC provides a guarantees end-to-end privacy and a recall of 1, but violates the efficiency requirement.
Private Set Intersection (PSI). We call the next class of approaches PSI, since they were originally designed for efficient private set intersection. Like APC, PSI also ensures IND-S2PC and the parties only learn the sizes of the databases and the set of matching records. The algorithms are efficient, but only ensure high recall for equality predicate like matching rules [12] .
The basic protocol works as follows: Alice defines a polynomial p(x) whose roots are her set of elements a ∈ DA. She sends the homomorphic encryptions of the coefficients to Bob. For each element b ∈ DB, Bob evaluates the encrypted valuesb = r · p(b) + b, where r is a random value, and sends them back to Alice. These values are decrypted by Alice and then matched with DA. If b / ∈ DA, then the decrypted value ofb will be a random value not matching any records in DA; otherwise, it will find a match from DA. The basic protocol described thus far required O(|DA| + |DB|) communications and O(|DA ×DB|) operations on encrypted values. [12] further optimizes the computational cost with Horner's rule and cryptographic hashing to replace single high-degree polynomial with several low-degree polynomials. This reduces the computational cost to O(|DB| · ln ln |DA|), and hence is sub-quadratic in n, for n = max(|DA|, |DB|).
The basic PSI algorithm returns pairs of records that are exact matches, and can be used to correctly compute the equijoin between two databases. However, it provides poor recall for other matching rules, especially when almost all matching record pairs are close but not equal. Extensions to PSI are known [12, 30] for a slightly larger class of fuzzy matching rules that require exact match on at least t out of T features, but the techniques do not extend to general matching rules like those that involve conjunctions, or complex distance metrics.
PSI with Expansion (PSI+X). The PSI technique can be used to achieve high recall for general matching rules by using the idea of expansion, if DA and DB have the same domains (i.e., ΣA = ΣB = Σ). For every record a ∈ DA, one could add all records a ∈ Σ such that m(a, a ) = 1 to get an expanded database D A . An equi-join between D x A and DB returns the required output DA 1m DB, and satisfies IND-S2PC. However, the expanded dataset can be many orders of magnitude larger than the original dataset making this protocol, PSI+X, inefficient (in the size of the original datasets). We empirically illustrate the lack of recall and inefficiency of PSI and PSI+X protocols (resp.) in § 5.
PRL with Blocking (PRL+B).
Blocking is commonly used to scale up non-private record linkage. Formally, We use B to represent both hashing and the blocking strategy B S . We refer to the set of pairs of records that are compared by a blocking strategy as candidate matches. A blocking B S is sub-quadratic if the number of candidate matches
is o(n 2 ), for n = max(|DA|, |DB|). Blocking techniques are useful as a pre-processing step [27, 20, 17 ] to achieve subquadratic efficiency and high recall. We can use blocking as a pre-processing step for APC -secure comparison is performed only for the candidate matches -resulting in a efficient protocol with high recall. However, as identified in prior work [6] , the blocking strategy itself can leak information about the presence or absence of a record in the database. This is because the number of candidate matches can vary significantly even if DB and D B differ in only one record. We formalize this result as Theorem B.1 in Appendix B.1.1.
PRL with DP Blocking (PRL+BDP ). Differential privacy has arisen as a gold standard for privacy in situations where it is ok to reveal statistical properties of datasets but not reveal properties of individuals. An algorithm satisfies differential privacy if its output does not significantly change when adding/removing or changing a single record in its input. More formally, A recent line of work has designed differentially private blocking algorithms as a preprocessing step to APC. DP hides the presence or absence of a single record, and hence the number of candidate matches stays roughly the same on DB and D B that differ in a single record. While this approach seems like it should satisfy all three of our desiderata, we have found that none of the protocols presented in prior work (on DP Blocking) [18, 22, 6] give us an end-to-end privacy guarantee. In fact, each paper in this line of work finds privacy breaches in the prior work. We also show (Theorem 4.3 in § 4) that even the most recent of these protocols in [6] does not satisfy an end-to-end privacy guarantee. This is because of a fundamental disconnect between the privacy guarantees in the two steps of these algorithms. DP does not allow learning any fact about the input datasets with certainty, while IND-S2PC (and PRL protocols that satisfy this definition) can reveal the output of the function f truthfully. On the other hand, while DP can reveal aggregate properties of the input datasets with low error, protocols that satisfy IND-S2PC are not allowed to leak any information beyond the output of f . Hence, DP and IND-S2PC do not naturally compose.
To summarize, none of the prior approaches that attempt to solve Problem 1 satisfy all three of our desiderata. Approaches that satisfy a strong privacy guarantee (IND-S2PC) are either inefficient or have poor recall. Efficient PRL with blocking or DP blocking fail to provide true end-to-end privacy guarantees. A correct conceptualization of an end-toend privacy guarantee is critical for achieving correctness, privacy and efficiency. Hence, in the following sections, we first define an end-to-end privacy guarantee for PRL to address this challenge ( § 3), and then present algorithms in this privacy framework to achieve sub-quadratic efficiency and high recall ( § 4).
OUTPUT CONSTRAINED DP
Designing efficient and correct algorithms for PRL is challenging and non-trivial because there is no existing formal privacy framework that enables the trade-off between correctness, privacy, and efficiency. In this section, we propose a novel privacy model to achieve this goal.
Output Constrained Differential Privacy
Both IND-S2PC (Definition 1) and Differential Privacy (Definition 3) ensure the privacy goal of not revealing information about individual records in the dataset. However, there is a fundamental incompatibility between the two definitions. IND-S2PC reveals the output of a function truthfully; whereas, nothing truthful can be revealed under differential privacy. On the other hand, differential privacy reveals noisy yet accurate (to within an approximation factor) aggregate statistics about all the records in the dataset; however, nothing other than the output of a pre-specified function can be revealed under IND-S2PC.
The difference between these privacy definitions can be illustrated by rephrasing the privacy notions in terms of a distance metric imposed on the space of databases. Without loss of generality, assume Alice is the adversary. Let G = (V, E) denote a graph, V is the set of all possible databases and E is a set of edges that connect neighboring databases. The distance between any pair of databases is the shortest path distance in G. Intuitively, the adversary's ability to distinguish protocol executions on a pair of databases DB and D B is larger if the shortest path between the databases is larger.
Differential privacy can be represented by the set of edges that connect neighboring databases that differ in the presence or absence of one record, |DB\D B ∪ D B \DB| = 1. This means, any pair of databases DB and D B are connected in this graph by a path of finite length that is equal to the size of their symmetric difference. While an adversary can distinguish protocol executions between some pair of "far away" databases, the adversary can never tell with certainty whether the input was a specific database. On the other hand, under IND-S2PC, every pair of databases that result in the same output for f (DA, ·) for a given DA are neighbors. However, there is neither an edge nor a path between databases that result in different outputs. Thus the output constraint divides the set of databases into disjoint complete subgraphs (in fact equivalence classes).
Example 1. Consider databases with domain {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Given DA = {1, 2}, the graph G for the database instances for DB are shown in Figure 1 . For the graph of differential privacy in Figure 1 (a), every pair of database instances that differ in one record is connected by an edge and form a neighboring pair. For instance, DB = {1} and D B = {1, 2} are neighbors under DP. Figure 1 (b) considers an output which consists of the size of DB and the intersection between DB and DA. Hence, all the instances in GIND−S2P C have the same datasize and have the same intersection with DA = {1, 2}. For instance, the fully connected 6 instances all have 2 records, but have no intersection with DA. The instance {1, 2} has no neighboring databases, but it is same as the output, so it requires no protection.
Comparing these two graphs, we can see that all instances in GDP are connected, and hence an adversary can not distinguish protocol executions on any pair of databases with certainty, but is allowed to learn statistical properties (with some error). This is not true under GIND−S2P C , where some instances are disconnected. For instance, an adversary can distinguish between protocol executions on {1, 2} and {1, 5} since they give different outputs when matched with DA.
From Example 1, it is clear that the privacy guarantees given by DP and IND-S2PC are different. To ensure scalable record linkage with formal privacy guarantees, we need the best of both worlds: the ability to reveal records that appear in the match truthfully, the ability to reveal statistics about non-matching records, and yet not reveal the presence or absence of individual non-matching records in the dataset. Hence, we propose a weaker but end-to-end privacy definition for the two party setting. 
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The third condition for (DB, D B ) ∈ N (f (·)) requires that no proper subset of record addition or deletion from (DB,
, the views of Alice during the execution of Π to any probabilistic polynomial adversary T satisfies
and the same holds for the views of Bob with A and δA.
If A = B = , δa = δ b = δ, we simply denote it as ( , δ, f )-constrained DP. Similar to differential privacy, output constrained DP satisfies composition properties that are useful for protocol design.
Theorem 3.1 (Sequential Composition). Given Π1 is ( 1, δ1, f )-constrained DP, and Π2 is ( 2, δ2, f )-constrained DP, then applying these two protocols sequentially, i.e. Π2(DA, DB, Π1(DA, DB))
Proof. See Appendix B.2. 
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Differential Privacy for Record Linkage
PRL can be a direct application of Output Constrained Differential Privacy by considering f1 m . We have the following theorem to define the neighboring databases for PRL. Next we define the privacy guarantee that allows us to design efficient PRL protocols with provable privacy guarantees and examples for such protocols will be presented in § 4.
Related Privacy Definitions
Both DPRL and IND-S2PC assume a computationally bounded model. We show that DPRL is a weaker guarantee than IND-S2PC. Proof. IND-S2PC for record linkage is equivalent to DPRL with = 0 and δ = negl(κ). The δ in DPRL is always greater than negl(κ) but smaller than o(1/n).
Hence, APC, PSI, and PSI+X techniques that satisfy IND-S2PC, guarantee (0,negl(κ))-DPRL as well.
Indistinguishable computationally differential privacy (IND-CDP-2PC) [23] is another privacy notion under a computationally bounded model, and is a direct extension of DP to the two party setting where both parties are computationally bounded. DPRL is weaker than IND-CDP-2PC. Formally The factor 2 is caused by the neighboring databases protected by DPRL have a symmetric difference of 2. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
Blowfish Privacy [16] also generalizes differential privacy to problems where constraints on the input database must hold (e.g., when query answers have been released by the database exactly). Output Constrained DP, including DPRL, is an extension of Blowfish in two ways: (1) from a computationally unbounded model to a computationally bounded model; (2) from a single-party setting to a two-party setting. Note that with the output constraint f1 m (DA, DB) = 
, the number of different records between neighboring databases DB and D B is only two. This is not necessarily true for other applications under Output Constrained DP, or Blowfish Privacy. This property is desirable for DP based algorithms as usually the larger the distance between neighboring databases, the more perturbation (noise) is required to hide the difference and the poorer the resulting utility.
Another instantiation of Blowfish privacy, known as Protected DP [21] , aims to protect the privacy of a subset of the population, but not the targeted ones in the population. This protected subpopulation is similar to the set of non-matching records in DPRL and the targeted ones are similar to the matching records. However, besides the differences inherited from Blowfish privacy, the set of matching records are learned as an output of the DPRL protocol, and hence are not available as an input to the protocol like the targeted subpopulation in the Protected DP algorithms.
PROTOCOLS FOR DPRL
In this section, we introduce protocols that satisfy DPRL and permit a 3-way trade-off between correctness, privacy and efficiency. First, we present the basic Laplace Protocol (LP) that can trade off privacy for efficiency. This protocol hides non-matching records by adding Laplace noise to the blocking strategy. Next, we design a Sort & Prune (SP) heuristic that is used in conjunction with LP and helps additionally tradeoff efficiency and recall. Finally, we present the Greedy Match & Clean heuristic optimization (GMC), that can further improve efficiency. We prove that all three protocols satisfy DPRL.
Laplace Protocol (LP)
In this protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a blocking protocol B with k bins and strategy B S , which we take as input to the protocol. The Laplace Protocol (LP, see Algorithm 1) works by inserting a carefully chosen number of dummy records into each bin of the blocking strategy such that the bin sizes are differentially private. While candidate matches may contain dummy records, they do not contribute to the output set of matches, as the dummy records do not match any record. The candidate matches are then securely matched using an IND-S2PC algorithm.
In the first step (Lines 1-4) of the protocol shown in Algorithm 1, Alice and Bob take their inputs DA and DB, the agreed blocking protocol B, and privacy parameters A, B , δA, and δB as input, and compute noisy binsB(DA) and B(DB) respectively. The noisy bins are constructed as follows (Algorithm 2). Records in D are first hashed into bins according to the blocking protocol B, and we denote B(D) as the set of bins of records from D. Then the counts of the bins are perturbed using noise drawn from a truncated and discretized Laplace distribution, such that the noisy counts satisfy ( , δ)-DPRL. The Laplace noise depends on not only the privacy parameters and δ, but also the sensitivity of the given blocking protocol B.
Definition 7 (Sensitivity of B). The sensitivity of the blocking strategy B for Bob, denoted by ∆BB is
the maximum bin count difference between DB and D B for any (DB, D B ) ∈ N (f1 m (DA, ·)) for all DA ∈ D. ∆BA for Alice is similarly defined.
If the hashing of B is the same for Alice and Bob, then ∆BA = ∆BB = ∆B. We assume this in our paper. If B hashes each record to at most k bins, then ∆B = 2k . Definition 8 (Lap( , δ, ∆B)). A random variable follows the Lap( , δ, ∆B) distribution if it has a probability density function given by
where p =
, and
This distribution has a mean of η0 and takes values that are both positive and negative. LP draws a noise value η from this distribution, and truncates it to 0 if η is negative. Then, η dummy records are added to the bin. These dummy records lie in an expanded domain, such that they do not match with any records in the true domain.
After Alice and Bob perturb their binned records, they will initiate secure matching steps to compare candidate matches, i.e. records inBi(DA) ×Bj(DB) if (i, j) ∈ B S . For each candidate match (a, b), Alice and Bob participate in a two party secure matching protocol SM C(a, b) that outputs the pair (a, b) to both Alice and Bob if m(a, b) = 1 (true matching pair) and null otherwise. Secure matching can be implemented either using garbled circuits [29] or (partially) homomorphic encryption [24] , depending on the matching rule (see Appendix C.1 for an example).
Clearly, compared to the original non-private blocking protocol B, no records are deleted, and dummy records do not match any real record. Hence, Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 1 gives the same recall as the non-private blocking protocol B it takes as input.
Next, we show that LP satisfies DPRL, and LP is efficient.
Theorem 4.2. Algorithm 1 satisfies ( A, B , δA, δB) -DPRL.
Proof. We prove privacy for Bob (the proof for Alice is analogous). In this protocol, Alice with input data DA has a view consisting of (1) the number of candidate matching pairs arising in each (i, j) ∈ B S , (2) the output for each candidate matching pair. Algorithm 1 is the composition of two steps: (a) add dummy records to bins, and (b) secure comparison of records within bins.
Consider a neighboring pair (DB, D B ) ∈ N (f1 m (DA, ·)) for a given DA. By Theorem 3.3, DB and D B differ in only one non-matching record with respect to DA, i.e. D B = DB −b * +b * and b * = b * , where m(b * , a) = 0 and m(b * , a) = 0 for all a ∈ DA. DB and D B can differ by at most ∆B in their bin counts. We show in Lemma B.2 (Appendix) that Algorithm 2 adds a sufficient number of dummy records to hide this difference: with probability 1 − δB, the probabilities of generating the same noisy bin counts for Bob, and hence the same number of candidate matching pairs consisting in each (i, j) ∈ B
S from DB and D B are bounded by e B . Thus, Step (a) ensures ( B , δB)-DPRL for Bob. Given a fixed view from Step (a) which consists of the noisy bin counts and encrypted records fromB(DB), Alice's view regarding the output for each candidate matching pair (a, b) is the same. The encrypted records for a given noisy bin counts can only differ in b * and b * , but both of them lead to the same output for each candidate matching, because they do not match any records in DA. Each secure pairwise comparison satisfies (0, negl(κ))-DPRL, and since there are at most n 2 comparisons (recall κ > n = max(|DA|, |DB|)). Thus Step (b) satisfies (0, negl(κ))-DPRL.
Therefore, using similar arguments for Alice and sequential composition, we get that Algorithm 1 satisfies DPRL.
LP only adds non-negative noise to the bin counts. Could we have instead added noise that could take positive and negative values, and suppressed true records if the noise were negative? We call this protocol LP-2. This is indeed the protocol proposed by prior work [18, 22, 6 ] that combined APC with DP blocking, and we can show that this minor change in LP results in the protocol violating DPRL (even thought the noise addition seems to satisfy DP)! Theorem 4.3. LP-2 does not satisfy ( , δ)-DPRL.
Proof. (sketch) The output of the record suppression step is dependent on the ratio between the matching and non-matching records in the bin. This introduces a correlation between the matching and non-matching records. Consider a neighboring pair DB and D B that differ by a nonmatching pair (b * , b * ). If b * is in a bin full of non-matching records with DA, and b * is in a bin full of matching records with DA (except b * ). DB is more likely to output all matching pairs than D B if some record is suppressed. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix B.1.2.
Next, we present our result on the efficiency of LP. Note that the communication and computational costs for LP are both O(cost B S ) and O(cost SM C,B S ), where cost B S is the number of candidate matches, and cost SM C,B S is the number of secure comparisons for B
S . Hence, we analyze efficiency in terms of the number of candidate pairs (and thus the number of secure pairwise comparisons) in LP.
Theorem 4.4. Given a blocking protocol B with k bins and blocking strategy B S , such that the number of candidate matches for DA and DB, cost B S (DA, DB), is sub-quadratic in n, i.e. o(n 2 ), where n = max(|DA|,
Since cost B S (DA, DB) and k are sub-quadratic in n, E(COST ) is also sub-quadratic in n.
Conditions (1) and (2) in the above theorem are satisfied by, for instance, sorted neighborhood, and distance based blocking [7] (we use the latter in our experiments). While the asymptotic complexity of LP is sub-quadratic, it performs at least a constant number of secure comparisons for each pair (i, j) ∈ B S even if there are no real records in Bi(DA) and Bj(DB). We can reduce this computational overhead with a slight loss in recall (with no loss in privacy) using a heuristic we describe in the next section.
Sort & Prune B S (SP)
Algorithm 1 draws noise from the same distribution for each bin, and hence the expected number of dummy records is the same for every bin. The bins with higher noisy counts will then have a higher ratio of true to dummy records. This motivates us to match candidate pairs in bins with high noisy counts first. Instead of comparing bin pairs in B S in a random order or index order, we would like to sort them based on the noisy counts ofB(DA) andB(DB). Given a list of descending thresholdst = [t1, t2, t3 . . .], the pairs of bins from the matching strategy B S can be sorted into groups denoted by B S,t l for l = 1, 2, . . ., where
Each group consists of bin pairs from B S with both noisy counts greater than the threshold.
We let the thresholdst be the deciles of the sorted noisy bin sizes ofB(DA) andB(DB). As the threshold decreases, 
Add O to O and send O to Bob ; 7 // Bob performs the following:
Add O to O and send O to Alice ; 12 until O received by Alice has no updates; the likelihood of matching true records instead of dummy records drops for bins. Alice and Bob can stop this matching process before reaching the smallest threshold int. In this way, bins with small counts that likely consist of only dummy records can be cleaned by GMC (since they do not appear in the match output). If the protocol stops at a larger threshold, the recall is smaller. In the evaluation, if the protocol stops at 10% percentile of the noisy bin counts, the recall can reach more than 0.95. This allows a trade-off between recall and efficiency for a given privacy guarantee. Next, we will show that this step also satisfies DPRL. Proof. Similar to the proof in Theorem 4.2, Alice with input data DA has a view consisting of (1) the number of candidate matching pairs arising in each (i, j) ∈ B S , and (2) the output for each candidate matching pair. As SP is a post-processing step based on the noisy bin counts, which is part of Alice's original view, the overall protocol still satisfies the same DPRL guarantee by Theorem 3.2.
We next present an optimization that also uses a form of post-processing to significantly reduce the number of secure pairwise comparisons in practice, but whose privacy analysis is more involved than that of SP.
Greedy Match & Clean (GMC)
LP executes a sequence of secure comparison protocols, one per candidate pair. After every comparison (or a block of comparisons), Alice and Bob learn a subset of the matches O. Based on the current output O, Alice and Bob can greedily search matching pairs in the clear from their respective databases (Lines 5,10 in Algorithm 3), and add the new matching pairs to the output set O until no new matching pairs can be found. In addition, Alice and Bob can remove records in the output from the binsB(DA) andB(DB) to further reduce the number of secure pairwise comparisons (Lines 4,9). We can see that this optimization step is not simply post-processing, because it makes use of the true record in plain text for matching. In traditional differential privacy, when the true data is used for computation, the privacy guarantee decays. However, we show that this is not true for the GMC step in the setting of DPRL. Proof. First consider the privacy for Bob. Alice with input data DA, has a view consisting of (1) the number of candidate matching pairs arising in each (i, j) ∈ B S , (2) the output for each candidate matching pair, (3) the output from plaintext comparisons with output records.
Consider a neighboring pair (DB, D B ) ∈ N (f1 m (DA, ·)) for a given DA. By Theorem 3.3, DB and D B differ in only one non-matching record with respect to DA, i.e. D B = DB −b * +b * and b * = b * , where m(b * , a) = 0 and m(b * , a) = 0 for all a ∈ DA. DB and D B can differ by at most ∆B in their bin counts. Similar to the proof for Theorem 4.2, the first step of the protocol adds dummy records to bins, and satisfies ( B , δB)-DPRL.
In the second step, given a fixed view VIEW * from the first step which consists of the noisy bin counts and encrypted records fromB(DB), Alice's view regarding the output for each candidate matching pair (a, b) is the same regardless (a, b) are compared securely or in plaintext. Alice's view regarding the output from plaintext comparisons with the records in the output set is also the same for a fixed VIEW * from the first step. The encrypted records for a given noisy bin counts can only differ in b * and b * , and they will never be pruned away. Both of them also lead to the same output for secure pairwise comparisons or plaintext comparisons, because they do not match any records in DA. Thus Step (b) satisfies DPRL.
With the same privacy guarantee, LP with the GMC step can even improve the recall and efficiency of LP. The proof details can be referred to Appendix B.5. In the evaluation, we will demonstrate how each optimization helps improve the efficiency of the basic LP.
EVALUATION
We empirically evaluate the correctness, privacy, and efficiency of the protocols proposed in § 4. Our experiments demonstrate the following:
• We show that the Laplace Protocol (LP, which includes all the optimizations) proposed in § 4 is over 2 orders of magnitude more efficient than the baseline approaches while still achieving a high recall and end-to-end privacy. ( § 5.2.1)
• At any given level of privacy, LP incurs a computational cost that is near linear in the input database size. 
Evaluation Setup
Datasets and Matching Rules: Taxi dataset (Taxi): To simulate linkage in the location domain, we extract location distribution information from the TLC Trip Record Data [3] . Each record includes a pickup location in latitude-longitude coordinates (truncated to 6 decimal places) and the date and hour of the pickup time. Taking the original dataset as DA, we create DB by perturbing the latitude-longitude coordinates of each record in DA with random values uniformly drawn from [−θ, +θ] 2 , where θ = 0.001. Each day has approximately 300,000 pickups. The data size can be scaled up by increasing the number of days, T . We experiment with T = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, with T = 1 being the default. Any pair of records a, b ∈ Σ are called a match if they have the same day and hour, and their Euclidean distance in location is no larger than θ. The location domain is within the bounding box (40.711720N, 73.929670W) and (40.786770N, 74.006600W). We project the locations into a uniform grid of 16 × 16 cells with size 0.005 × 0.005. A blocking strategy B S based on the pickup time and grid is applied to both datasets, resulting in (16×16×24T ) bins. B S compares pairs of bins that are associated with the same hour, and corresponding/neighboring grid cells. Thus, each bin in B(DA) is compared with 9 bins in B(DB).
Abt and Buy product dataset (AB): These datasets are synthesized from the online retailers Abt.com and Buy.com [1] who would like to collaboratively study the common products they sell as a function of time. Each record in either dataset consists of a product name, brand and the day the product was sold. The product names are tokenized into trigrams, and hashed into a bit vector with a bloom filter having domain Σ = {0, 1} 50 . We consider 16 brands, and sample 5,000 records per day from the original datasets for Abt and Buy each. The data size can be scaled up with T for T = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, with 1 being the default for T . Any pair of records a, b ∈ Σ are called a match if (a) they are sold on the same day, (b) they are of the same brand, and (c) the hamming distance between their vectorized names is no more than θ = 5. A blocking strategy hashes records having the same value for day and brand into the same bin. This results in 16T bins, and records falling in the corresponding bins are compared.
Protocols:
We evaluate four DPRL protocols: (1) Laplace protocol (LP), (2) all-pairwise comparisons (APC), (3) private set intersection (PSI), and (4) private set intersection with expansion (PSI+X). The default LP consists of the basic protocol described in Algorithm 1 along with optimization steps (SP and GMC) in § 4.2 and 4.3.
Metrics: There are three dimensions in the trade-off space: correctness, privacy and efficiency. The correctness of a protocol is measured by the recall, which is the fraction of the matching pairs output by the algorithm, as defined in Eqn. 1, with larger values close to 1 being better. The privacy metric is specified in advance for each algorithm using parameters , δ. For AP, PSI, and PSI+X, = 0 and δ = negl(κ) by Theorem 3.4. We consider A = B = and δA = δB for ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 1.6} and δ ∈ {10 −9 , 10 −7 , 10 −5 } for LP. The default value for and δ is 1.6 and 10 −5 , respectively. Finally, we define efficiency of APC and LP protocols for a given dataset as the number of secure pairwise comparisons, and denote this by cost. The cost of PSI and PSI+X can be estimated as γn ln ln(n), where γ is the expansion factor, or the ratio of sizes of the expanded and true databases. This represents the number of operations on encrypted values. For PSI, γ is 1. We use the number of secure comparison/operations on encrypted values rather than the wallclock times as a measure of efficiency, since these operations dominate the total time. We discuss wallclock times in more detail in § 5.2.4.
Results and Discussions

Efficiency and scalability
In this section, we empirically investigate how LP scales as the data size increases (T ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 16}) in comparison to baselines APC and PSI+X, when all the algorithms achieve 100% recall. We do not include PSI as its recall is close to 10%. LP is evaluated at privacy parameter ∈ {1.6, 0.4, 0.1} and fixed δ = 10 −5 . At each , we report the average number of candidate pairs for LP over 10 runs for each value of T . To achieve 100% recall, PSI+X expands each record b in DB to every other record b within a θ-ball around b. We add 2369936 records per record in the AB dataset, and 1000 2 π records per record in the Taxi dataset.
In Figure 5 .1, we report the log(base 10) value of the average cost log(cost) with respect to the log value of data size log(n) for PSI+X, APC, and LP with varying and the non-private setting (np) when they achieve a recall of 1.0. Results for Taxi are shown on the left, and AB are shown on the right. For both datasets, the baseline methods, PSI+X and APC, have data points and line segments above LP for the plotted data size range. When the Taxi dataset has a size of 10 5.5 , LP at = 0.1 costs an order of magnitude less than APC, as shown by the leftmost brown point (APC) and blue point (LP,eps=0.1) in Figure 5 .1(left). As the data size increases, the gap between APC and LP gets larger. When data size increases by 16 times (the right most points in the plots), LP at = 0.1 costs over 2 orders of magnitude smaller than APC. When increases, the cost of LP shifts downward towards the non-private setting (np). When = 1.6, LP is has 3 orders of magnitude lower cost than APC for the given range of data sizes. The line for np is the lower bound for LP where no dummy records are added to the bins. Similar observations are found in Figure 5 .1(right) for the AB dataset, where LP improves APC by up to 2 orders for the plotted data size range.
PSI+X has a much larger cost than both APC and LP. This is mainly due to the fact that the expansion factor is far larger than the data size. We also observe that the lines that pass through the points of APC for both Taxi and AB datasets have a slope of 2, which corresponds to the quadratic communication and computational cost of APC. LP and PSI+X have slopes of values slightly larger than 1, and thus are linear time. Thus, for sufficiently large data sizes, PSI+X can beat APC. However, we do not expect PSI+X to beat LP due to the large expansion factor.
We also report the cost of LP when it achieves a recall less than 1.0. The protocol stops before achieving full recall in Figure 5 in Appendix C.2. Similar results are observed as the case where recall of 1.0 is obtained.
Optimization steps
We next study the effectiveness of the optimization steps for LP. We study 5 protocols as defined below:
• 'basic': the basic LP in Algorithm 1 with no heuristic optimizations; • 'basic+SP': the basic LP with the sort & prune step (SP). SP stops the protocol when the threshold reaches to the 10% percentile of the noisy bin counts ofB(DA) andB(DB). Together with the sorting step, bins pairs with insufficient counts can be pruned away, resulting in a recall slightly smaller than the highest possible recall.
• 'basic+GMC': the greedy match & clean step (GMC) in Algorithm 3 is applied to the basic LP;
• 'basic+GMC+S': in addition to the previous protocol, bins are sorted in order of size. Pruning is omitted so that the highest possible recall is achieved.
• 'basic+GMC+SP': this protocol is the same as the previous protocol, except it prunes the bins with counts in the bottom 10% percentile. Hence, the default LP can be also denoted by 'basic+GMC+S' if recall is 1.0 and 'basic+GMC+SP' if recall is less than 1.0.
In Figure 3 , we report the average cost with the standard deviation across 10 runs of the above mentioned protocols at = 0.1, 0.4, 1.6 and δ = 10 −5 for the Taxi and AB datasets when T = 1 and T = 16. Several interesting observations arise from this plot.
First, the most significant drop in cost is due to GMC. The protocols with the greedy step have smaller cost than other protocols for all and datasets. For the Taxi datasets at T = 1 or T = 16, 'basic+GMC' saves the cost of 'basic' by over 50% when = 1.6. When reduces, these relative savings reduce because more dummy records are added and cannot be matched or removed by this greedy step. For the AB datasets, 'basic+GMC' reduces the cost of 'basic' by up to 16% at = 1.6 and 11% at = 0.1.
Next, adding the sorting step to GMC (GMC +S) improves upon GMC when the data sizes are large (T=16). For instance, when = 0.1 and T = 16, 'basic+GMC+S' can further bring the cost down by approximately 8.0 × 10 6 candidate pairs for the AB datasets, and by 2.0 × 10 9 for the Taxi datasets.
Third, the cost of 'basic+GMC+SP' is reported at a recall reaching above 0.95. The reduction with respect to 'basic+GMC+S' is relatively small, but the absolute reduction in cost is significant in some setting. For instance, the number of candidate pairs is reduced by 5.0 × 10 6 for the AB (4) 'basic+GMC+S' -the previous protocol with addition sorting step described in § 4.2, and (5) 'basic+GMC+SP' -the protocol stops at recall less than full recall.
datasets when = 0.1 and T = 16. Last, for the AB dataset at T = 16, 'basic+SP' has a smaller variance in cost than 'basic' at = 0.1. Similarly, 'basic+GMC+SP' has a smaller variance in cost than 'basic+GMC'. This implies the sort & prune step can help prune away bins, and hence reduce the variance introduced by dummy records.
Three-way trade-offs
All the DPRL baseline methods including APC, PSI and PSI+X, have a fixed and strong privacy guarantee where = 0 and δ = negl(κ). Hence, each baseline has a single point in a plot between recall and efficiency for a given data size, where APC and PSI+X have a point with a full recall and a high cost, and PSI has a point with a low recall and a low cost. Here, we will show that LP allows a trade-off between recall and efficiency for a given privacy guarantee. The efficiency metric used here is the ratio of the cost(LP) to the cost(APC). Figure 4 (a) illustrates the case when both Alice and Bob require ( , δ)-DPRL protection where = {0.1, 0.4, 1.6} and fixed δ = 10 −5 . In Figure 4 (b), we vary the values of δ for δ ∈ {10 −9 , 10 −7 , 10 −5 } with fixed = 1.6. Each data point in the plot corresponds to the average cost(LP)/cost(APC) and average recall of the default LP for a given ( , δ) and the default data size with T = 1. The default LP allows the sort & prune step as described in § 4.2 with a list of thresholds that are the 90%, 80%, ..., 0% percentiles of the sorted bin sizes ofB(DA) andB(DB). We report the average recall and cost(LP)/cost(APC) for each percentile. This gives a trade-off line for each and δ value.
First, we observe that all the trade-off lines obtain a high recall at very small values of cost(LP)/cost(APC). Even at = 0.1, LP incurs 100 times smaller cost than APC. LP has a slightly larger cost for AB dataset.
In Figure 4 (a), the trade-off lines between recall and efficiency shift rightwards as the privacy parameter gets smaller. In other words, the cost is higher for a stronger privacy guarantee in order to output the same recall. Similar observations are found in Figure 4(b) . However, the trade-off lines are more sensitive to than δ. The red lines in Figure 4 (a) and the red lines in Figure 4 (b) correspond to the same privacy setting. As δ reduces by 10000 times from 10 −5 to 10 −9 , the trade-off line of LP for the Taxi datasets shifts the ratio of costs by at most 0.001 as shown in Figure 4 (b) (left) while the trade-off line increases the ratio of costs to 0.07 as reduces from 1.6 to 0.1 (Figure 4(a) ).
As the Taxi and AB dataset have different data distributions over bins, the shapes of the trade-off lines are different. AB datasets are more skewed and have some bins with large counts. These bins also have many matching pairs, and hence we see a steep rise for the first part of the trade-off lines for the AB datasets. When the data size increases, if the distribution of matching pairs remains similar, the tradeoff lines between the efficiency and recall tends to stay the same. These trade-off lines can be useful when choosing the recall, privacy and efficiency for larger datasets.
Wall clock times
We implemented APC and LP in python, and implemented operations on encrypted records using the Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem using the python-paillier library [2] . As all algorithms require a one-time encryption of records we exclude this cost and only measure the cost of operations on the encrypted records. On a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 machine with 16 GB RAM, we found that computing the Hamming distance of two encrypted records with dimension d = 50 takes an average of ts = 77 ms. That is, for datasets of size n = 5000, APC would take over 22 days to complete! Additionally, for the same dataset with = 1.6, LP would only take 80 hours to achieve a recall of 1. In comparison, the wall clock time of LP ignoring the time spent in comparisons of encrypted records was only 120 seconds. Thus, the computational cost of LP is dominated by the cost of secure comparison. How to improve the unit cost of each secure pairwise comparison is an important research topic, and is orthogonal to our research. Hence, in this evaluation, we focused only on the number of secure comparisons/operations on encrypted values to measure efficiency.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a novel privacy model, called output constrained differential privacy, that shares the strong privacy protection of differential privacy, but allows for the truthful release of the output of a certain function on the data. We showed that this new privacy model can be applied to record linkage to define differential privacy for record linkage (DPRL). Under this framework, we proposed novel protocols for efficient PRL that satisfy three desiderata: correctness, privacy and efficiency. This is an important advance, since none of the prior techniques achieve all three desiderata. We investigated the efficiency of these protocols with two datasets. Our results suggest that the Laplace Protocol (LP) can achieve high recall with sub-quadratic communication and computational cost while ensuring provable end-to-end DPRL. Directions for future research include identifying DPRL protocols that further reduce the computational complexity of record linkage, extending twoparty DPRL to a multi-party protocol, and generalizing the notion of output constrained differential privacy to other applications beyond private record linkage.
[29] A. C. The standard simulation-based definition for SMC is defined below.
Definition 9 (SIM-S2PC).
[15] For a functionality f , a 2-party protocol Π which computes f provides simulationbased secure 2-party computation (SIM-S2PC) if for all data sets DA, DB of polynomial sizes (in κ), there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (simulators), denoted by SA and SB such that the distribution of SA (resp., SB) is computationally indistinguishable from VIEW Π A (resp., VIEW Π B ), i.e. for any probabilistic polynomial (in κ) adversary T ,
If f is deterministic, Alice gains no additional knowledge other than its respective input (DA) and output (fA(DA, DB)); similarly for Bob. When randomized functionalities are concerned, augmenting the view of the semi-honest party by the output of the other party is essential. In this case, for any protocol Π that computes the randomized functionality f , it does not necessarily hold that O Π (DA, DB) = f (DA, DB). Rather, these two random variables must be identically distributed. In order to study the possibility of composing DP and S2PC, we choose the indistinguishability-based definition for PRL, which is implied from SIM-S2PC.
Proof. Given the protocol Π, for all possible inputs (DA, DB), there exists a global simulator SA such that the distribution of SA is computationally indistinguishable from the view of Alice. As f (DA, DB) = f (DA, D B ), SA takes the same input and hence will have the same distribution for DB and D B . Hence, the views over (DA, DB) or (DA, D B ) are indistinguishable.
Any algorithm that satisfies SIM-CDP also satisfies IND-CDP [23] , but it is unknown if the converse holds.
A.2 Computationally Differential Privacy
Mironov et al. [23] defines a privacy notion, known as indistinguishable computationally differential privacy (IND-CDP-2PC). This notion is a direct extension of DP in two party setting where both parties are computationally bounded. In Theorem 3.5, we state that DPRL is weaker than IND-CDP-2PC. Here is the proof.
Proof. /2-IND-CDP-2PC is equivalent to -IND-DP-2PC, where neighboring databases have a symmetric difference of 2. The set of neighboring databases for DPRL is a subset of that for -IND-DP-2PC, and hence ( , δ)-DPRL is weaker than /2-IND-DP-2PC.
B. THEOREMS & PROOFS B.1 Privacy Leakage in Prior Work
B.1.1 PRL with Blocking
Blocking scales up the pairwise record comparisons in both non-private and private case.However, unlike a nonblocking PRL protocol, a PRL protocol with blocking does not necessarily guarantee IND-S2PC. A necessary condition for IND-S2PC is that the blocking strategy B S is data independent. Let cost B S (DA, DB) be the number of candidate matches with a given blocking strategy B S , this condition implies that cost B S (DA, DB) = cost B S (DA, D B ) for any pair of (DB, D B ) where f1 m (DA, DB) = f1 m (DA, D B ). If cost B S (DA, DB) = cost B S (DA, D B ) with high probability, then the adversary can distinguish DB and D B from the runtime with non-negligible certainty. The common blocking techniques used in prior work such as q-gram based hash signatures [4] or SparseMap [27] can be regarded as instances of a large class of blocking techniques known as Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [14] , formally defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH)).
A family of functions H is said to be (d1, d2, p1, p2)-sensitive, where d2 > d1 and p1 > p2, if for all h ∈ H,
In general, we can show that any LSH based blocking cannot satisfy IND-S2PC. 
Alice as a semi-honest adversary can set her dataset such that |B h(b) (DA)| = |B h(b ) (DA)|. Then she can distinguish DB and D B by C B S (DA, DB) = C B S (DA, D B ) with high probability 1 − p2. Therefore, this LSH-based PRL does not satisfy IND-S2PC.
B.1.2 Limitations of PRL with DP Blocking
Several prior works [18, 22, 6] combine PRL techniques with differentially private blocking (PRL +BDP ). These approaches can be summarized in three steps: (1) DP blocking, (2) records addition and suppression, (3) secure pair-wise comparisons based on blocking strategy B S . In the first step, Alice and Bob process their data independently. Each party generates an -differentially private partition of the data, where each partition is associated with a noisy count oi = |Bi(DB)| + ηi, where
is the normalized factor 2 .
Next, for each partition, if the noise ηi is positive, dummy records are added; otherwise, records in that partition are suppressed randomly to obtain the published count. This results in new bins, denoted by {Bi(DA)} and {Bj(DB)}. In the last step, Alice and Bob jointly compare record pairs (a, b), where a ∈Bi(DA) and b ∈Bj(DB) for all (i, j) ∈ B S as in APC. They only exchange the true records (a, b) if they match. [6] considers a third party for identifying candidate pairs for Alice and Bob, so that Alice and Bob has no direct access to the noisy bins of the opposite party, but has access to the number of secure comparisons. However, we show that the hybrid protocol above does not satisfy ( , δ)-DPRL as stated in Theorem 4.3. The failure to satisfy DPRL is mainly caused by the record suppression step for the negative noise drawn from a zero-mean Laplace distribution. We will show the proof for Theorem 4.3.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider Alice as the adversary. For any arbitrary and small δ < , we can construct a counter example as follows. Let B be the blocking with k bins used in the protocol Π. For a given DA, consider DB such that all records can find some matching ones from DA, except b * ∈ B1(DB) and |B1(DB)| = 1. In addition, B0(DB) has a size of 1 ≤ |B0(DB)| < . A neighboring database D B can be constructed from DB by removing b * from B1, and adding another non-matching record b * that can be hashed to B0. It is easy to see that (DB, D B ) ∈ N (f1 m (DA, ·)).
Without a third party [18, 22] , Alice and Bob has access to the number of secure comparisons and the noisy bin counts (in addition to the input data sizes and the matching output) Given a view of Alice VIEW * with output O = DA 1m DB 2 We use discrete version of Laplace distribution to avoid rounding. and noisy countsõi = |Bi(DB)|. LetB(DA) be the noisy bins that Alice uses for the final secure pairwise comparisons. The probabilities to generate this view from DB and D B are respectively:
The inequality above is derived from the assumption that |B0(DB)| < 
Hence, ( , δ)-DPRL is violated.
With a third party [6] , Alice and Bob has access to the final output, and the total number of secure pairwise comparisons, but not the noisy bin counts. We can construct examples where knowing the number of secure comparisons leaks the noisy bin counts. After which the previous arguments (for the case with no third party) can show that this protocol does not ensure DPRL for all epsilon and delta. For instance, consider Alice has only 1 record inB1(DA), and more than 1 records in other bins, if the output O = DA 1m DB, and the total number of secure pairwise comparisons is |O|+1. This secure pairwise matching that returns false can only happen between a record of Bob with the record from B1(DA). Hence, Alice can infer the noisy counts ofB(DB). Then the argument for the case with no third party can be used.
B.2 Theorem 3.1 (Sequential Composition)
Consider Alice as a probabilistic polynomial (in κ) adversary T , with input DA. (DB, D B ) are neighbors w.r.t. f (DA, ·). We have the probabilities of distinguishing DB and D B are bounded as below. 
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B.4 Theorem 4.2 (Laplace Protocol for DPRL)
Lemma B.2. With probability 1−δ, the probability for Alice having the same view from neighboring databases (DB, D B ) ∈ N (f1 m (DA, ·)) is bounded by e . Proof. First, we will show that the efficiency of LP with the greedy match & clean step (GMC) is better than LP alone. The first part of the protocol that adds dummy records is the same. The second part of the protocol without GMC compares all the candidate matches using the secure matching protocol SM C(a, b). On the other hand, with GMC, if a record pair (a, b) is compared securely, then (a, b) must be one of the candidate matches. Hence, the number of the secure pairwise comparisons with GMC will be no more than the protocol without GMC.
Next, we will show the correctness of LP with GMC. Let OLP , OLP +GM C be the final output of LP protocol without GMC and with GMC. We would like to show that if (a, b) ∈ OLP , then (a, b) ∈ OLP,GMC . Suppose this is not true, then there exists a matching pair (a, b) ∈ OLP , but (a, b) / ∈ OLP +GM C . If so, then one of the records in (a, b) must be removed from the bins before its turn of secure pairwise comparison SM C(a, b). Without loss of generality, let's say a is cleaned from Alice's bins before SM C(a, b). The condition to remove a is that a has already been in the current output. Hence, Bob is able to compare a with all his records in plain text and identify this matching pair (a, b). This leads to a contradiction. Hence, OLP ⊆ OLP +GM C . Moreover, if a matching pair (a, b) is not a candidate match based on the blocking strategy B S , and if a has been already found matching with another record of Bob, then GMC can add (a, b) into OLP +GM C . Hence, it is possible that LP with GMC gains even more matching pairs than LP alone.
C. ADDITIONAL EVALUATION C.1 Example for secure pairwise match
Here we give an example for the function SM C(a, b) that outputs (a, b) if they match; null otherwise. The matching rule is that Euclidean distance of a and b is less than θ. First, Party Alice creates a homomorphic public/private key pair (pk, pr), and sends the public key pk to party Bob. Let E pk (·) denote the encryption function with public key pk and Dpr(·) the decryption function with private key pr. Paillier's cryptosystem supports the following operations on the encrypted plain texts m1 and m2 without the knowledge of the private key:
• Addition: E pk (m1 + m2) = E pk (m1) + h E pk (m2);
• C.2 Comparison with baselines for recall less than 1.0 Figure 5 shows the log(base 10) value of the average cost log(cost) with respect to the log value of data size log(n) for PSI+X, APC, and LAP with ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 1.6} and δ = 10 −5 and the non-private setting (np) when they achieve a recall more than 0.95. For both datasets, the baseline methods, PSI+X and APC,have data points and line segments above LP for the plotted data size range. The trend of this plot is similar to Figure 2 .
